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The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. The Legal System
Howard M. Rubin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen an increase in civil pro se litigants seek-
ing to prosecute or defend their rights. While some have decided
to proceed in the courts without counsel as a matter of choice,
most have been forced to do so. The poor have found legal assist-
ance unavailable for many of their problems,' and many in the
middle income community have found the private bar priced be-
yond their resources.
The absence of legal aid services is most severe in rural areas.
Government cut-backs in funding of free legal assistance programs,
plant closings, the decline in farm economy, and a high rate of
unemployment have resulted in an ever increasing need to resort to
the legal system without counsel for resolving conflicts or to forego
their resolution. In southern Illinois, thirteen counties are serviced
by two legal aid offices with a total of only eight attorneys.' It is
not surprising that the poor and lower middle income communities
have a low expectation of finding legal services and tend to view
pro se advocacy as an alternative for access to the legal system.
The urban areas, while having a greater availability of legal aid
for indigents, cannot meet their civil legal needs or that of the
lower middle income population.3 The cost of legal services for
those with marginal income has created an increasing pro se pres-
ence in the courts. The problem has been most severe in areas such
as family law, housing court, and consumer disputes.
* Clinical Associate Professor and Director of Legal Services, DePaul College of
Law Legal Clinic; B.S., 1967, University of Illinois; J.D., 1971, DePaul College of Law.
1. Illinois Legal Needs Study, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP (1989). The low income
households surveyed throughout Illinois reported experiencing an average of 1.69 distinct
non-criminal legal problems per household in the last year for which they had no legal
help. Id.
2. Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Murphysboro and Mt. Vernon
Offices.
3. Illinois Legal Needs Study, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP (1989). "Our primary im-
pression was that the potential client population for all civil legal services providers in
Chicago is totally overwhelming .... The 'working poor' or 'marginally indigent' have
legal needs that are at least equal to those of people who met official poverty standards."
Id.
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The recent Illinois Judicial Conference for Associate Judges4
took special note of this problem. For the first time, the agenda of
the seminar program included "Indigent and Pro Se Litigation" as
one of its topics. A panel of judges and law professor reporters
under the leadership of the Honorable Anne O'Laughlin Scott dis-
cussed the situation faced by courts in effectively coping with a
very difficult situation.
II. THE DILEMMA
Under Illinois law, any person has a right to represent himself or
herself in a civil action.' This basic right has created an ordeal in
the courts arising from the statement, "I wish to represent myself."
From this point on, the adversary system, upon which civil proce-
dure rules are based, is out of synchronization. The judge is faced
with the task of balancing fundamental fairness and order in the
proceedings. The pro se litigant must struggle with how to present
his or her case. The opposing attorney must protect and advocate
his or her client's interest, while meeting the legal obligation to
bring the truth to the court's attention. Further, the party repre-
sented by counsel, having a right to demand vigorous representa-
tion, must cope with escalating legal costs because of numerous
delays.
The essential, yet often conflicting, demands of fairness and or-
der create a nearly impossible situation. While many in the legal
system have cried out in anguish over the dilemma, little has been
done to remedy the problem. The prestigious National Judicial
College, which serves as the principal continuing education facility
for judges across the country, has little in its resource bank on the
problem.6 The Illinois court system has left each judge to struggle
with the issue case-by-case. For every appellate decision that has
held pro se litigants to a strict standard, there is one that required
or allowed the rules of procedure to be altered considerably for the
unrepresented litigant. Trial judges have had to follow their own
procedures based upon widely varying discretion.
The following sections will highlight the various legal issues in-
4. Illinois Judicial Conference Associate Judges Seminar, March 9-11, 1988.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, para. II (1987). The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Plaintiffs shall have the liberty of prosecuting, and defendants of defending in their
proper persons ...." Id.
6. Currently, the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, has only limited materi-
als on pro se litigants in trial disruption situations.
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volving pro se litigants. While certainly not presenting a uniform
standard, the case law has given some guidance to the trial judge.
III. THE LAW
A. Pro Se Strict Standard
Illinois courts have long held that persons who choose to repre-
sent themselves must comply with the procedures of the court and
are not to expect favored treatment by a court.7 Illinois appellate
courts have encouraged a strict standard, instructing the trial court
to provide no more leniency toward pro se plaintiffs regarding pro-
cedural standards than generally is allowed attorneys.8 This has
been held to apply equally to trial and appellate proceedings.9 If
we were to follow this long established principle strictly, there
would be little difficulty in disposing of the pro se litigant.
In reality, however, this principle is often in direct conflict with
the court's obligation to ensure a fair trial. It is virtually impossi-
ble to expect a pro se litigant to understand proper objections to
tendered evidence. Many lawyers continue to struggle with the
rules, such as those concerning hearsay, opinion testimony, privi-
leged communications, and parol evidence. Therefore, courts have
gone to extreme measures to ensure equity.
B. Pro Se Liberal Standard
Trial courts, although never abandoning the strict standard, may
find a way to allow for significant deviations from the standard in
the interest of equity. Trial courts will vacate a judgment based on
justice and fundamental fairness,1" and the appellate courts have
7. See, e.g., Biggs v. Spader, 411111. 42, 103 N.E.2d 104 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952) (appellant had a right to appear pro se, but when he did, he was required to
comply with the established rules of procedure).
8. See, e.g., Harvey v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 280, 391 N.E.2d 461
(1st Dist. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980) (court refused the plaintiff's request to
apply more lenient procedural standard because she was apro se litigant); Kay v. Kay, 46
Ill. App. 2d 446, 197 N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist. 1964) (husband who decided to represent
himself in a divorce action had no reason to complain of court's refusal to allow him to
procure counsel after divorce was granted to his wife).
9. Boeger v. Boeger, 147 Ill. App. 3d 629, 498 N.E.2d 814 (2d Dist. 1986) (appellate
court held that pro se appellant's brief failed to state sufficiently specific objections to the
trial court's order); Harvey v. Carponelli, 117 Ill. App. 3d 448, 453 N.E.2d 820 (Ist Dist.
1983) (pro se litigant's brief was flagrantly deficient in many respects and violative of rules
for appellate briefs, and pro se litigant properly found in contempt by trial judge for
conduct at trial).
10. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 485 N.E.2d 438 (ist Dist.
1985). In Rodriguez, the defendant appeared pro se in a forcible entry and detainer ac-
tion, and the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1018, 485 N.E.2d at 440.
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found jurisdiction notwithstanding the impropriety of pro se
briefs. I" The concept of justice and fundamental fairness overcom-
ing a failure to comply with legal procedure is not restricted to pro
se cases, but can be found throughout the law.12
Recognizing that no one standard will be appropriate in every
case and .that no precedent will ensure fairness, case law has sup-
ported broad discretion in the trial judge. Appellate courts, how-
ever, have failed to provide a clear message to the trial judge
regarding the proper exercise of this discretion.
C. Court Assistance to the Pro Se Litigant
In attempting to be fair and to further the discovery of truth, a
court may find itself explaining rules and procedures and asking
questions of the witnesses. In this regard, the court has broad dis-
cretion as to its role in providing a fair trial to both sides.' 3
In Oko v. Rogers,"' the trial judge, faced with a pro se defendant
surgeon in a medical malpractice action, on several occasions took
over the questioning of witnesses on behalf of the defendant to fa-
The defendant subsequently retained counsel and filed a timely motion to vacate, which
was denied. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, finding that relevant
evidence was not presented at trial and that fundamental fairness and justice required
granting timely motion to vacate. Id. at 1022, 485 N.E.2d at 442.
II. See, e.g., In re J.M., 170 Ill. App. 3d 552, 524 N.E.2d 1241 (2d Dist. 1988). In In
re J. M., a pro se father appealed a finding of authoritative intervention concerning neglect
of his minor child. The appellate court held that although his brief was inadequate, it
would consider the arguments to the extent they were properly presented. Id. at 556, 524
N.E.2d at 1244. The case was remanded twice.
There is a natural tendency, however, to be less sympathetic and flexible with pro se
litigants who are not indigent and who decide to proceed without the benefit of an attor-
ney either because of a mistrust of attorneys or for economic reasons. Despite the ability
to obtain counsel, the law requires the same standard for all pro se litigants. Neverthe-
less, a court may allow the assessment of attorney's fees, if provided by statute, against
the non-indigent pro se party where appropriate. Booth v. Booth, 122 II. App. 2d 1, 258
N.E.2d 834 (1st Dist. 1970) (pro se litigant, although successful on issue before trial
court, was required to pay the attorney's fees of the other party pursuant to statute).
12. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Gleeson, 49 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 364 N.E.2d 557, 560
(1st Dist. 1977); Hunt v. General Improvements, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 3d 421, 362 N.E.2d
1143 (4th Dist. 1977) (petitions to vacate judgment should contain sufficient allegations,
but justice and fairness may require that relief be granted even though there is a lack of
due diligence).
13. When an attorney decides to represent himself, the conflict in roles and emotional
involvement usually amount to a disaster. Many attorneys fail to heed the old admoni-
tion: "An attorney who represents himself has a fool for a client." The attorney who is a
party is to be treated as a litigant, and a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees
even if he is an attorney. Hamer v. Lentz, 171 Ill. App. 3d 888, 525 N.E.2d 1045 (1st
Dist. 1988).
14. 125 Ill. App. 3d 720, 466 N.E.2d 658 (3d Dist. 1984).
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cilitate a coherent defense.'" The trial court explained tactical al-
ternatives available to the defendant, conducted his direct
examination, and advised him of the proper way to ask questions
of witnesses. Testimony that would have been stricken had an at-
torney been representing him was allowed over objection.' 6 On ap-
peal, the court upheld the trial judge's actions and, recognizing the
patience, skill, and understanding required, stated:
As any judge or lawyer knows, the conduct of a jury trial with a
pro se litigant who is unschooled in the intricacies of evidence
and trial practice is a difficult and arduous task. The heavy re-
sponsibility of ensuring a fair trial in such a situation rests di-
rectly on the trial judge. The buck stops there.' 7
The dissenting opinion in this case appears to be more in line
with the well-settled standard in Illinois as to the rights and obliga-
tions of the pro se litigant. It made clear the trial court's failure to
hold the defendant to the rules of procedure and evidence. The
assisting of the defendant and special rulings in his favor were un-
acceptable. As the dissenting judge stated:
To condone such actions of the trial court here is to invite pro se
representation in difficult trials which would make a mockery of
the judicial process, even though to fully inform a jury is a com-
mendable purpose. Defendant was entitled to a fair opportunity
to present his evidence, but nothing more.' 8
Nevertheless, cases such as this continue to confuse trial courts as
to their conduct and the standard by which a decision will be
reviewed.
D. Demeanor and Admonitions
If any area has been consistent, it is the acknowledgment by the
appellate courts of the trial judge's demeanor in being considerate
and patient with a pro se party in light of the party's lack of famili-
arity with trial practices,' 9 and in apprising pro se litigants of the
right to be represented by counsel.20 The trial judge must always
be careful to give proper admonitions.
15. Id. at 723, 466 N.E.2d at 660.
16. Id. at 726, 466 N.E.2d at 662 (Barry, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 723, 466 N.E.2d at 661.
18. Id. at 726, 466 N.E.2d at 662 (Barry, J., dissenting).
19. See In re Marriage of Winters, 160 Ill. App. 3d 277, 512 N.E.2d 1371 (2d Dist.
1987) (pro se litigant claimed he was denied fair trial; the appellate court noted that the
trial court was considerate to him, while requiring him to follow same rules as litigants
represented by an attorney).
20. See In re Marriage of Pahlke, 120 Il1. App. 3d 1009, 458 N.E.2d 1141 (1st Dist.
1983) (trial court informed pro se party of her right to be represented by counsel; appel-
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In Serpico v. Urso,2' the pro se defendant alleged that while he
waited for his case to be called before the trial court (from 9:00
a.m. until 2:00 p.m.), he consumed at least five ounces of whiskey
and, as a result, he was unable to understand the proceedings.22 At
trial, the defendant admitted paternity, and the court found him to
be the father and ordered him to pay child support.23
On appeal, the defendant claimed that he was not informed of
his rights prior to his plea. Nevertheless, the record showed that
the defendant answered affirmatively to the questions of whether
he knew that he had a right to both a trial on the issue of paternity
and to a blood test. 24 The appellate court found that the defendant
was never advised of his right to plead not guilty, of the necessity
to be proven guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, or of the
fact that if the blood test excluded him as the father, he must be
found not guilty. 25 Consequently, the appellate court vacated the
trial court's order.26
E. Pro Se Pleadings
Due to a lack of formal legal training or, even worse, illiteracy,
many pro se litigants fail to state causes of action or to respond
appropriately to allegations. The decision to allow an amendment
of a pleading is a matter within'the sound discretion of the trial
court and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, the decision
will not be disturbed on appeal. 27
Despite this broad discretion, the law is clear that trial judges
are to be liberal with pleading requirements of unrepresented par-
ties. The Code of Civil Procedure only requires plain and concise
statements that reasonably inform the opposite party.28 These pro-
visions are designed to promote the resolution of controversies
based on substantial justice between the parties, rather than on
technicalities of pleading. 9 Illinois case law on pleadings also has
late court held that once she waived counsel and represented herself, she was responsible
for her own defense and could not expect favored treatment from the court).
21. 127 Ill. App. 3d 667, 469 N.E.2d 355 (1st Dist. 1984).
22. Id. at 668, 469 N.E.2d at 356.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 672-73, 469 N.E.2d at 359.
26. Id. at 673-74, 469 N.E.2d at 360.
27. Whildin v. Kovacs, 82 I11. App. 3d 1015, 403 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist. 1980) (trial
court's denial of litigant's request to file a second amended counterclaim upheld on
appeal).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-603(a), 2-612(b) (1987).
29. Schultz v. Continental Casualty Co., 79 I11. App. 3d 1035, 398 N.E.2d 936 (1st
1004 [Vol. 20
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served to assist courts in overcoming the pro se litigant's inability
to articulate his or her cause of action precisely.3 °
There is, however, a limit to the liberal construction afforded pro
se pleadings. In People v. Krueger,31 it was argued that a letter to
the court by the defendant should serve as an answer. The letter
did not respond to the complaint, and it referred to the judge as
"Old Hell-is-From (Ellison)" and to the clerk of the court as the
"jerk of the court."' 32 The pro se party also included his own court
rule "No. 3," stating: "Prosecutor must sign complaint with the
appropriate color of 'no point' crayon (yellow) and only after his
'Mommy' gives him permission. ' 33 The court stated that "while
documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed,
even a liberal construction would not add meaning to the docu-
ments filed below." 34
F Continuances
The backlog of cases faced by many courts results in part from
the failure to dispatch justice promptly. The threat of a continu-
ance, which wreaks havoc with the trial court's case management,
is a greater problem when a pro se litigant is involved. After being
encouraged by the bench to seek counsel, the party usually is given
extra time in which to find an attorney. In situations where this
attempt fails or when the party wishes to proceed pro se, time usu-
ally is required to correct pleadings, bring in demonstrative evi-
dence, and prepare for the presentation of the case. The need to be
fair to the pro se party by granting additional time must be bal-
anced against the rights of the adversary to proceed expeditiously
and with a minimum of attorney's fees. With a reasonable warn-
ing, the court may impose a limit on continuances and require that
the rules be followed in seeking postponement.
The Code of Civil Procedure provides a court with broad discre-
tion in granting extensions of time and continuances. 35 This dis-
Dist. 1979) (second amended complaint stated a cause of action, and plaintiff entitled to
complete copy of insurance policy for inspection).
30. See Horwath v. Parker, 72 Il. App. 3d 128, 390 N.E.2d 72 (1st Dist. 1979) (leave
to amend should be granted unless it is apparent that no cause of action can be stated);
Dangeles v. Marcus, 57 Il. App. 3d 662, 373 N.E.2d 645 (1st Dist. 1978) (dismissal
appropriate only if no set of facts could be proven under pleadings that would entitle
party to relief).
31. 146 Il. App. 3d 530, 495 N.E.2d 993 (3d Dist. 1986).
32. Id. at 534, 495 N.E.2d at 996.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1007 (1987).
1989] 1005
Loyola University Law Journal
cretion is narrowed somewhat by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23136 and local circuit court rules relating to the continuance of a
trial. The rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County allow an at-
torney only one continuance based upon an engagement in another
trial or hearing. 37 A court's consistency and adherence to the rules
will assist both sides in the adjudication of the case.
In In re Marriage of Shalashnow,3s the petitioner sought an or-
der allowing her to remove her children from Illinois to Ohio.39
The respondent opposed the move and presented a motion for a
directed finding at the close of the petitioner's case. The petitioner
requested a continuance to produce further evidence, which the
trial court granted in the interest of judicial economy.' At a later
date, the hearing resumed and the petitioner, having presented fur-
ther evidence, was allowed to remove the children from the state.4"
The appellate court held that the trial court should not have
granted the petitioner's motion for a continuance because Supreme
Court Rule 231 requires that a party making a motion for a contin-
uance based on the absence of material evidence support the mo-
tion with an affidavit, which was not provided in the present case.42
The appellate court ruled, however, that it was not reversible error
in that a prima facie case for removal had been made prior to the
continuance, and it would not be in the children's best interest to
have further proceedings because the removal had already
occurred.4 3
G. Competency of Pro Se Litigant
The legal question of a pro se litigant's competency occasionally
will arise. The presumption of competency exists in the pro se situ-
ation as it does in any civil matter. When confronted with a pro se
litigant who appears to be clearly incompetent, the court may, as a
procedural matter, appoint a guardian ad litem to act as a repre-
sentative for the party. The court has no duty to assume the role of
a petitioner for the appointment of a conservator." Anything be-
36. ILL. S. CT. R. 231, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 231 (1987).
37. CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY Rule 5.2(a).
38. 159 Ill. App. 3d 760, 512 N.E.2d 1076 (2d Dist. 1987).
39. Id. at 761, 512 N.E.2d at 1077.
40. Id. at 762, 512 N.E.2d at 1077.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 764, 512 N.E.2d at 1079.
43. Id. at 765, 512 N.E.2d at 1079.
44. See Frieders v. Dayton, 61 11. App. 3d 873, 378 N.E.2d 1191 (2d Dist. 1978)
(trial court refused counsel's request to declare an elderly defendant incompetent and to
1006 [Vol. 20
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yond the appointment of a guardian ad litem is best left for the
statutory adjudication of incompetence. If a person has not been
declared legally incompetent, it remains within the trial court's dis-
cretion whether the person's mental condition is such that his or
her testimony would be completely untrustworthy, thus rendering
the individual incompetent to testify. 45
IV. DEVELOPMENTS
It would be naive to suggest that there is a simple solution to the
pro se dilemma. Nevertheless, while the problem will continue to
challenge the legal system, there have been measures taken to im-
prove the situation which are worthy of recognition and further
development.
A. Small Claims Courts
The purpose of small claims courts and their rules is to provide
an expeditious, simplified, and inexpensive procedure for the reso-
lution of disputes involving small amounts. The rules have been
modified to accommodate the nature of the action and the pro se
litigant. In cases in which the claim does not exceed $1,000, the
court may, on its own motion or that of any party, adjudicate the
dispute at an informal hearing. The court is allowed to call wit-
nesses and to participate in all direct and cross-examination.46
appoint a conservator, but it did appoint a guardian ad litem; the appellate court upheld
the decision, stating that absent adjudication of incompetence, there is no bar to a suit).
45. Piano v. Davison, 157 11. App. 3d 649, 510 N.E.2d 1066 (Ist Dist. 1987). In
Piano, the court stated that:
A distinct difference separates a probate court's adjudication declaring a person
legally incompetent, from a trial court's decision that a person's mental condi-
tion is such that his testimony would be completely untrustworthy thus render-
ing him incompetent to testify .... It is not reversible error to fail to appoint a
guardian ad litem for an adult litigant who has not been formally declared an
incompetent.
Id. at 667-68, 510 N.E.2d at 1079 (citations omitted).
46. ILL. S. CT. R. 286(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 286(b) (1987). The rule
states in relevant part:
In any small claims case where the amount claimed by any party does not ex-
ceed $1,000, the court may, on its own motion or on motion of any party, adju-
dicate the dispute at an informal hearing. At the informal hearing all relevant
evidence shall be admissible .... The court may call any person present at the
hearing to testify and may conduct or participate in direct and cross-examina-
tion of any witness or party. At the conclusion of the hearing the court shall
render judgment and explain the reason thereof to all parties.
Id. See also Obernauf v. Haberstich, 145 Ill. App. 3d 768, 496 N.E.2d 272 (2d Dist.
1986) (trial judge may examine the plaintiff and allow the defendant to amend pleadings
to include the affirmative defense raised by the court's questioning).
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Although previously limiting discovery in small claims cases
(under $2,500), the rules now also limit motions.47 These are cases
which, due to economics, produce great numbers of pro se litigants.
The bar and bench should make active use of the new rules to help
accomplish the purpose for which they were intended. In Bouhl v.
Gross,48 the court stated that the small claims rules "were designed
to allow pro se litigants an opportunity to obtain the resolution of
disputes in a quick, simple, and informal manner unbridled by the
technicalities and legal formalities which normally apply in a court
proceeding."49 The court supported the trial court's broad discre-
tion in regard to the ordering of pleadings. The court stated that
"[t]he small claims procedure will not be simplified, inexpensive, or
expedited if the rigid pleading requirements of the Code are always
held to apply if the small claims rules are silent."50
B. Pro Se Court
Even though the small claims courts have adopted rules and
procedures to handle small cases effectively, an arena was needed
where the pro se litigant would be welcomed. In 1972, Cook
County established a special pro se branch of the small claims
court. The pro se branch is intended for use by non-lawyers as it
recognizes that the amounts involved would make affordable legal
counsel impractical. The popularity of the "People's Court" and
recent amendments to the rules affecting small claims matters re-
flect the trend toward smaller amounts in controversy being re-
solved without attorneys and with simplified procedures. The pro
se branch of the various circuit courts should be encouraged. A
greater use of mediation is the next likely development in the effec-
tive disposition of minor disputes.
C. Civil Court Appointment of Counsel
For some time, trial judges have sought the aid of the attorneys
who frequent their courtroom in assisting with indigent pro se liti-
gants. The attorneys usually called upon have been from the legal
assistance programs that already are overburdened with work.
The Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to assign counsel
who "shall perform their duties ...without any fees, charge or
47. ILL. S. CT. R 287(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 287(b) (1987).
48. 133 I11. App. 3d 6, 478 N.E.2d 620 (4th Dist. 1985).
49. Id. at 11, 478 N.E.2d at 624.
50. Id.
1008 [Vol. 20
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reward" to persons declared indigent." More frequent and ran-
dom attorney assignments can, in part, meet the obligation of the
private bar to provide pro bono services.
The court also has the authority to appoint counsel as an aide to
a pro se party to protect the judicial process from deterioration,
and to assist the pro se party who is attempting to defend himself
or herself.5 2 When appointing a licensed senior law student pursu-
ant to Supreme Court Rule 7l1,1 3 the party must be informed and
give consent.54
A cooperative effort by courts and local bar associations to pro-
vide legal assistance at the inception of a pro se case can produce
dramatic results in the quality of adjudication and in keeping to a
minimum the delays in litigating a matter. The Cook County Cir-
cuit Court and the Chicago Bar Association Young Lawyers Sec-
tion have a program whereby young attorneys volunteer time in
the Clerk's office to assist pro se litigants in both drafting pleadings
and understanding the procedure in small claims matters. This has
been successful not only in the court's administration of these mat-
ters, but also in overcoming the negative public perception that
attorneys only pursue matters that have a monetary reward.
D. Circuit and Division Rules
It would be easier for everyone involved if the judges in the vari-
ous districts or divisions discussed uniform guidelines for handling
the pro se case. Consistency among courts regarding the number of
continuances given for the purpose of seeking counsel, and in re-
maining firm on proceeding after the opportunity to seek counsel is
given (and that after trial there will be no second chance with
counsel5 ), would improve the system by lending predictability to
the procedure. Cases would be resolved more expeditiously while
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, para. 5-105 (1987).
52. In re Tuntland, 71 111. App. 3d 523, 390 N.E.2d 11 (1st Dist. 1979) (appointment
of a public defender to guide pro se party upheld).
53. ILL. S. CT. R. 711, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 711 (1987).
54. People v. Moore, 63 Il. App. 3d 899, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1st Dist. 1978) (respon-
dent in a commitment hearing and appearing pro se was appointed a rule 711 senior law
student as an advisor; because the respondent was not informed of the law student's
status, the lower court's commitment order was reversed).
55. See, e.g., Meeker v. Gray, 142 I1. App. 3d 717, 492 N.E.2d 508 (5th Dist. 1986)
(party represented to court that he desired to represent himself; the argument on appeal
that he was entitled to a new trial because he had no attorney and was forced to proceed
pro se was found to be insufficient); In re Marriage of Pahlke, 120 Il1. App. 3d 1009, 458
N.E.2d 1141 (1st Dist. 1983); Kay v. Kay, 46 Ill. App. 2d 446, 197 N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist.
1964).
1989] 1009
Loyola University Law Journal
still permitting each judge discretion concerning the particular case
before the bench.
E. Pro Se Materials
Some of the circuit courts in Illinois and several bar associations
have prepared written materials to assist the pro se litigant. These
range from warning sheets which cite to strict legal standards and
seek to frighten the person into finding an attorney,56 to booklets
attempting to inform the person about time requirements, basic
procedure, and the pitfalls of litigation. These two approaches are
not totally incompatible, and an encouragement to seek counsel
with informative material is probably the best alternative. Courts
that have a high volume of pro se litigants, such as small claims,
domestic relations, and paternity, should include admonitions in
their written materials relating to the basic legal rights to which
the person is entitled and to the burden that he or she faces. In
paternity cases, this would include the right to plead not guilty, the
necessity to prove guilt by a preponderance of the evidence (in lay-
man terms), the right to a trial, and the right to take blood tests
that could exclude the alleged father as the guilty party. 7
Another useful document used by many courts is a handout list-
ing all of the legal aid offices available in the area. Greater effort,
however, is needed by the court administration in preparing and
updating the lists, as some contain inaccurate information, includ-
ing disconnected phone numbers. Such a situation only leads to
frustration and fails to accomplish the intended purpose of reduc-
ing the number of unrepresented litigants before the bench. Fur-
ther, it supports the prevalent negative impression of the legal
system held by those having difficulty finding access to the courts.
Court forms that are available to attorneys can also be prepared
to assist the pro se litigant. Where a simple contract dispute is at
issue, a pre-printed pro se complaint58 can provide a place for all
necessary information to overcome frequent pleading deficiencies.
56. Notice to People Acting as Their Own Attorney, Cook County. The notice was
handed out to pro se litigants by the Clerk's office. Although the origin is unknown, it
clearly was intended to persuade the recipient to obtain an attorney by referring to the
attorney standards, the statutory prohibition of court personnel giving legal advice, and
the Clerk of the Circuit Court not being required to provide preprinted pleading forms.
57. Serpico v. Urso, 127 I11. App. 3d 667, 469 N.E.2d 355 (1st Dist. 1984). See supra
notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
58. Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Form CCMI-PSC, Pro Se Complaint.
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V. CONCLUSION
A legal system created for attorneys to adjudicate disputes will
always have problems in coping with a pro se litigant. The legal
community has failed to effectively reduce the obstacles encoun-
tered. The inconsistent case law and widely varying discretion
vested in trial judges have ensured confusion concerning the
boundaries within which the pro se litigant must present his or her
case, what opposing counsel can anticipate in the way of proce-
dure, and the trial judge's role. Instead of accepting the situation
as a recurring nightmare, we must make a greater effort with the
present rules and seek creative alternatives to make the legal sys-
tem work more effectively. Once we have accomplished this at the
trial level, we can focus on coping with the pro se litigant who wins,
asking, "How do I collect?" and the one who loses, asking, "How
do I appeal?"
0
